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We use FDA’s seafood inspection records to examine: (i) how FDA has targeted 
its inspections under HACCP regulation; (ii) the effects of FDA inspections on 
compliance with both HACCP and plant sanitation standards; and (iii) the relationship 
between HACCP regulations and pre-existing sanitation standards.  We use a theoretical 
model of enforcement to to derive hypotheses about FDA’s targeting of inspections and 
firms’ patterns of compliance.  We test those hypotheses using econometric models of 
inspection and compliance.  Contrary to the predictions of the theoretical model and to 
FDA’s own stated policies, FDA does not seem to have targeted inspections based on 
product risk or past compliance performance.  Firms’ compliance strategies seemed to be 
broadly in accord with the predictions of the theoretical model.  The threat of inspection 
increased the likelihood of compliance, although the deterrent effect was statistically 
significant for sanitation standards but not for HACCP.  Firms tend to persist in 
compliance status, especially with respect to sanitation standards.  Contrary to FDA’s 
presupposition, however, HACCP compliance does not improve compliance with 
sanitation standards, suggesting that the two are not complementary. 
 
Key words:  HACCP, food safety, seafood, enforcement, regulatory compliance, 
regulation. 
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1. Introduction 
Increased incidence of (sometimes fatal) foodborne illness due to bacterial 
contamination has made concerns over food safety more widespread.  These concerns 
have motivated the introduction of a new approach to food safety regulation based on the 
Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) concept.  HACCP is grounded in 
well-established principles of quality control and has been proven effective in individual 
firms’ efforts to achieve stringent food safety standards (Mayes and Mortimore 2001, 
Huleback and Schlosser 2002).  How well the concept translates into a program for 
improving regulatory oversight of food safety is less clear, since implementation of 
HACCP regulations depends heavily on self-reporting by regulated firms, subject to 
infrequent (and imperfect) validation by regulatory agencies whose enforcement 
capabilities are limited by (often severe) resource constraints. 
This paper focuses on a set of HACCP-based food safety regulations implemented 
by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for seafood processing in 1997.  We 
develop a theoretical model of imperfect enforcement in a regulatory environment like 
that created by HACCP, where regulatory standards are idiosyncratic to each firm and 
where determination of the degree of compliance is subject to error. Using this model, we 
derive predictions about the FDA’s optimal monitoring strategy and regulated firms’ 
optimal compliance efforts.  Then, we test those predictions using data from the first four 
years of the seafood HACCP program in order to draw inferences about the effects of 
HACCP on FDA’s overall regulatory program for seafood safety.  Our empirical analysis 
concentrates on four major questions: (i) What is the inspection strategy implemented by the FDA for enforcing the seafood HACCP regulation? (ii) Is that strategy in accord with 
its stated goals? (iii) What effects does FDA monitoring have on seafood processing 
firms’ compliance with HACCP and plant sanitation regulations? and (iv) What is the 
relationship between the FDA’s HACCP program and its pre-existing regime of plant 
sanitation regulation?  
The effects of monitoring on regulatory compliance in a HACCP-based regime 
have not, to the best of our knowledge, been studied to date.  The bulk of the literature on 
regulatory HACCP programs has focused either on explicating the basic principles 
involved (Unnevehr and Jensen 1996, Cato 1998, Huleback and Schlosser 2002) or on 
estimating compliance costs, especially in meat packing (Antle 2000, Muth et al. 2002).  
Other studies of microbial risk have focused on deriving risk management protocols 
(Holcomb et al. 1999, Hope et al. 2002, McMasters and Todd 2004, Oscar 2004, Nauta et 
al. 2005, Vialette et al. 2005) or investigating determinants of risk perceptions and hence 
the value of food safety improvements (Gordon 2003).
1  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide 
background on the seafood HACCP program. In section 3, we present a theoretical model 
and use it to make predictions about the optimal monitoring strategy and optimal choice 
of effort by the regulated firms. We also present a hypothesis about the relationship 
between HACCP and the pre-existing sanitation program. Section 4 describes the data.  
Sections 5 and 6 presents our econometric model. We present and interpret the results in 
Section 7.  Section 8 offers concluding remarks. 
                                                 
1 There is a sizeable economics literature on the optimal design of enforcement policy in various legal 
environments and on the determinants of enforcement strategies in practice (see Polinsky and Shavell 
(2000) for a survey of law enforcement generally and Cohen (1999) for a survey of applications to 
environmental regulations), albeit not in the context of food safety and plant sanitation per se. 
  22. FDA’s Seafood HACCP Program 
Seafood consumption accounts for a disproportionately large share of foodborne 
illnesses in the United States, about 15 percent of the 76 million cases occurring annually 
compared to 0.7 percent of total food consumption (General Accounting Office 2001, 
Putnam and Allshouse 1999); other OECD countries report similar experiences (Cato 
1998).  The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act makes the FDA responsible for 
regulating food safety in seafood processing.  Prior to 1997, the FDA addressed that 
responsibility by conducting periodic inspections focusing on hygiene and sanitation at 
seafood processing plants.  As a means of improving the efficacy of its oversight and 
food safety in the seafood sector, FDA published a final rule requiring that seafood 
processors develop and implement HACCP systems for their operations in 1995. The 
regulation became effective in December, 1997.  FDA incorporated enforcement of the 
new HACCP standards into its pre-existing sanitation inspection regimen.  
HACCP is based on seven principles of food safety engineering: (i) identifying 
hazards that are reasonably likely to occur; (ii) identifying critical control points at which 
preventive measures can be applied effectively; (iii) establishing critical operating limits 
for critical control points, i.e., specifying how preventive measures should be used; (iv) 
monitoring those critical control points to ensure that preventive measures are operating 
properly; (v) specifying corrective actions to be taken when monitoring indicates that 
preventive measures have not functioned properly; (vi) keeping records of monitoring 
data and actions taken; and (vii) using those records to verify periodically that the system 
is working properly (see for example Cato 1998, McEachern et al. 2001, and Huleback 
  3and Schlosser 2002).  These principles give general guidance about the way that seafood 
processors should design and conduct their operations.   
FDA’s HACCP regulation requires seafood processing firms to have a written 
plan that applies these seven principles appropriately to its operation and to keep records 
documenting how well that plan has been implemented.  Each firm’s HACCP plan must 
be approved by FDA.  FDA conducts periodic follow-up inspections to make sure that 
the plan remains satisfactory given the seafood processing performed by the firm and that 
the plan is being implemented properly.  FDA inspectors check the firm’s paperwork, 
plant, and equipment in the plan approval process and in subsequent enforcement 
inspections.  They also observe the production process in action to ensure that the firm’s 
plan records accord with actual processing operations. 
At the time of its introduction, the HACCP was seen by all involved as a win-win 
proposition.  It was believed that consumers would benefit from increased seafood safety; 
the seafood processing industry would benefit from increased demand due to increased 
safety that would outweigh the modest costs of compliance; and FDA itself would benefit 
from an ability to utilize its scarce enforcement resources more effectively (Food and 
Drug Administration 2001).  Preliminary analyses, however, raise questions about 
implementation.  In January 2001, the General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a highly 
critical report questioning the effectiveness of the program.  The GAO claimed, among 
other things, that (i) too many firms were exempted from the HACCP plan requirement; 
(ii) too many firms were out of compliance with the regulation two years after its 
implementation; and (iii) too many inspections consisted solely of paperwork audits 
  4because plants were not processing the particular product being inspected the day of the 
inspection.
2   
FDA itself acknowledged that implementing the HACCP program had proven 
difficult because it involved elements that were largely unfamiliar to many seafood 
processors, as well as some inspectors (Food and Drug Administration 2001).  FDA also 
identified a number of measures being taken to improve its implementation of the 
HACCP regulation, including increasing the frequency of inspections (from once every 
four years prior to the HACCP program to annually since its implementation), improving 
guidance and training for both industry and inspectors, and intensifying inspection efforts 
aimed at products that posed the greatest threats of foodborne illness.  With respect to the 
latter, FDA targeted operations processing (i) scombroid fish, which can produce toxic 
histamine compounds as a result of partial bacterial spoilage, (ii) smoked fish and (iii) 
cooked ready-to-eat fish products, in which control of pathogens can be problematic.
3  
Our empirical analysis examines the extent to which this targeting seems to have been 
implemented.
4 
The problems experienced by FDA in implementing the new seafood HACCP 
regulation may have been derived from the novelty of the regulatory paradigm, which 
                                                 
2 A probability sample of 97 inspection records from three inspection regions found that between 16 and 23 
percent of the plans were inadequate, and that implementation of between 12 and 31 percent of the plans 
was inadequate.  FDA itself reported that 22 percent of the inspections conducted in 1999 uncovered that 
there was no HACCP plan when one was required. 
3 Breaded seafood products, which can result in the development and ingestion of toxins if handled 
improperly, were also originally identified as a high-risk group of products. In this report, FDA found that 
significant progress towards improvement of food safety had been made. Aquaculture products were also 
identified as potentially risky because of the possible exposure of these facilities to human and animal 
waste. In 2000 and 2001, a relatively large number of problems were reported for these products, but the 
agency was cautious in drawing conclusions about possible trends due to the small number of plants 
processing these products. 
4 It is noteworthy that despite these measures, the incidence of foodborne illness from pathogens associated 
with seafood consumption has been rising since the year 2000, even as the incidence of foodborne illness 
from pathogens associated with consumption of meat and dairy products and eggs has declined (Centers for 
Disease Control 2005). 
  5placed new, unfamiliar demands on agency staff and on seafood processing firms.  New 
regulatory regimes typically require the application of new operating procedures. If those 
procedures differ significantly from those utilized in the old regime, both firms and 
agency staff may find it difficult to adapt to them.  However, one rationale for 
introducing the HACCP program was that HACCP methods would allow FDA to enforce 
existing food safety and plant sanitation standards more efficiently. This rationale 
suggests that FDA viewed HACCP monitoring and its pre-existing sanitation monitoring 
as complements rather than substitutes.   Our empirical study examines the extent to 
which this belief is true. 
3. HACCP Enforcement and Compliance Strategies: Predictions from Theory 
The preceding discussion of HACCP-based regulation suggests that it has six 
distinctive features.  First, HACCP is primarily a process rather than a performance 
standard and, hence, depends on firms’ inputs (although monitoring of performance 
outcomes like bacterial counts is included in some HACCP plans).  Second, the fact that 
each firm has its own approved HACCP plan indicates that the process standard is 
idiosyncratic to each firm.  Third, during the enforcement phase, the standard with which 
the firm must comply is predetermined, so that the agency’s sole choice involves the 
precision with which it monitors the firm’s precautionary effort.  Fourth, heavy reliance 
on inspections of paperwork mean that determination of compliance is subject to error.  
Fifth, penalties for non-compliance are set legislatively and are thus predetermined 
relative to enforcement strategy.  Sixth, FDA is required to monitor all seafood 
processing plants at some point in time.   
  6In the remainder of this section, we propose a theoretical model of agency and 
firm behavior that incorporates these features. Consider a government agency charged 
with enforcing HACCP regulations and a firm subject to that regulation.  The firm’s 
HACCP plan consists of a set of preventive activities designed to achieve a level of food 
safety the agency considers adequate, e.g., to achieve an acceptably low level of health 
damage due to consumption of the firm’s products.  Let a represent the firm’s level of 
precautionary effort and a  the level of effort specified in the firm’s HACCP plan.  If the 
firm is found to be out of compliance with this standard, it is subject to a penalty s.  Both 
the HACCP standard a  and the penalty s are set during the initial development and 
implementation of the HACCP plan independently from enforcement considerations and 
are, thus, predetermined for enforcement purposes.  After the initial plan development 
and implementation phase, the firm must choose the level of (costly) precautionary effort 
it wishes to exert, a.   
Food poisonings are seldom traced definitively to the firm’s products, so firms are 
rarely liable for damages.  For simplicity, we treat all social damage from inadequate 
precautionary effort as costless to the firm. This assumption does not affect the results of 
the analysis. 
Under HACCP regulation, the firm is required to keeps records that indicate its 
exertion of precautionary effort.  Personnel from the regulatory agency periodically 
inspect the firm’s facility and observe both the firm’s records and other evidence of the 
firm’s precautionary activity.  We denote this observed level of precautionary effort as y.  
This observation is unbiased but subject to error: 
(1)   ε ⋅ − + = ) 1 ( m a y ,  
  7where ε is a zero-mean error term and the variance of the observation error depends on m, 
the precision with which the agency monitors the firm.  The agency can increase the 
precision of its monitoring by inspecting the firm more often or by conducting lengthier, 
more intrusive inspections.  Increasing monitoring precision is costly. 
The agency chooses its monitoring strategy to minimize the observed expected 
avoided cost of health damage plus the cost of monitoring, K(m). 
(2)   ) ( )} ) 1 ( ( { m K m a a D E + − + − ε . 
Equation (2) assumes that the health damages depend on the difference between the 
observed effort and the standard.
5  
The firm’s optimal choice of precautionary effort minimizes the total cost of 
HACCP compliance, which equals the cost of precautionary effort C(a) plus the expected 
penalty from being found out of compliance  ) , , ( m a a sF , where  ) , , ( m a a F  is the 
probability of observing the firm out of compliance.  Under a set of standard assumptions 
this model results in the following five predictions that we test empirically:
 6  
Hypothesis 1.  Firms that exert less precautionary effort will be monitored with 
greater precision.  Thus, firms that have been observed to have been out of 
compliance in the past and firms the agency expects to exert less precautionary 
effort will be inspected more frequently. 
Hypothesis 2.  Firms facing a more stringent HACCP standard will be monitored 
with greater precision.  Thus, firms whose products pose a greater food safety risk 
will be inspected more frequently. 
                                                 
5 This does not mean, of course, that the damages to human health are zero when the firm meets the 
standard exactly or exerts more effort than the standards, i.e.,  ) ( y a D − can be positive when  y a −  is 
negative. 
6 Formal proofs are presented in Appendix A.  
  8Similarly, the firm’s compliance strategy can be characterized as follows:
  
Hypothesis 3.  Firms expecting more precise monitoring will exert greater 
precautionary effort.  Thus, firms facing a higher probability of being inspected 
are more likely to be in compliance. 
Hypothesis 4.  Firms facing a more stringent HACCP standard will exert greater 
precautionary effort.  Thus, firms whose products pose a greater food safety risk 
are more likely to be in compliance. 
Hypothesis 5.  Firms for which compliance is more costly will exert less 
precautionary effort and are, thus, less likely to be in compliance.  Past non-
compliance is an indicator of greater compliance costs.  Thus, firms that have 
been out of compliance in the past will be less likely to be in compliance in later 
inspections. 
We test the first two hypotheses by estimating a model of inspection by the agency, and 
then test hypotheses 3-5 by estimating an equation that predicts compliance as a function 
of plant characteristics and expected inspections by the agency.   
FDA (2001) has argued that good sanitation practices are important for successful 
implementation of the firm’s HACCP plan, so that the two regulatory programs should be 
seen as complements.  If so, one would expect plants that are in compliance with one 
program to have a higher likelihood of being in compliance with the other. If instead the 
two programs are substitutes, perhaps because of competing use of limited resources, 
then plants that are in compliance with respect to one would be less likely to be in 
compliance with the other.  We therefore formally test  
  9Hypothesis 6. From the perspective of the plant, HACCP and the sanitation 
program are complements.
7  
4. The Data 
We examine the research questions identified in the introduction and hypotheses 
1-6 empirically using a dataset that documents inspections of seafood processing plants 
by federal and state inspectors from the onset of the HACCP program to June 13, 2002.  
There were a total of 16,751 inspections at 6027 plants spread over the United States and 
its territories.  In the remainder of this paper, attention is restricted to the 4,443 plants in 
the United States, for a total sample size of 14,255 observations. 
A. Inspections 
Because the observation period is over 4 years, one would reasonably expect most 
plants to have been visited by inspectors more than once over the study period.  While the 
average number of inspections per plant is 2.30, and, as shown in Table 1, almost 94% of 
the plants have been inspected at least once, we found that 80% were inspected 4 times or 
less, which means less than once a year on average. Only 20% of the plants were 
inspected 5 or more times, which means on average at least once a year. In sum, most 
plants have not quite been inspected once a year as purported by the FDA (Food and 
Drug Administration 2000).  Inspection rates did not increase over time; instead, the 
number of plants inspected each year actually decreased over time (Figure 1), presumably 
                                                 
7 In its initial evaluation of the seafood HACCP program, FDA speculated that introducing the HACCP 
regulation might increase the violation rate initially because processors would be held to stricter standards 
than under the previous sanitation inspection regime.  For example, a plant may be considered out of 
compliance because it fails to comply with the HACCP requirements even if the products it makes are not 
contaminated. Our data do not allow us to test this proposition because we lack information on processors’ 
compliance status prior to the HACCP program. 
  10because the FDA established that certain plants did not need an inspection under the 
HACCP program. 
While the number of plants inspected declined over the study period, the total 
number of inspections remained stable over the first three years, and then rose by 
approximately 15% in 2001, the last year for which we have complete inspection records. 
We believe that this happened because plants deemed not to be subject to the HACCP 
requirements were no longer inspected for HACCP violations. Once eligible plants were 
added to the inventory of plants to be inspected, however, a regular schedule of 
inspections would begin.  The FDA may have also intensified its scrutiny at plants where 
evidence of poor performance was mounting. We examine this conjecture in more detail 
in our econometric model of inspection. 
The number of inspections conducted is low from October through January and 
much higher during April-September. This pattern is probably due to the heightened pace 
of commercial fishing activities during the summer months. It is interesting to note that 
there is a small dip in the number of inspections conducted in July, despite the fact that 
largest number of vessel landings typically occurs in that month.
8  
The majority of the inspections—about 68.6%--were conducted by federal 
inspectors. State inspectors were responsible for 10.9% of the inspections, and inspectors 
working under federal-state agency partnership were in charge of the remaining 19.7%.   
Manufacturing plants account for the lion’s share of all inspections (81.6%), with 
repackagers and warehouses taking 16% and 14%, respectively, and vessels accounting 
for only about 3 percent. It should be kept in mind that some establishments are placed in 
more than one of these categories, so that the percentages do not necessarily sum to 100.  
                                                 
8 See the US National Marine Fisheries Service (www.nmfs.gov).  
  11The majority of the inspections (58.9%) take place at plants that process 
histamine-producing fish. Plants that make cooked ready-to-eat products (e.g., canned 
tuna) receive about 26% of all inspections, and are trailed by plants that process other 
categories of products (22.6% of the inspections), smoked products (about 10%), and 
finally, breaded and aquaculture products (5% and 2.6%, respectively).  
These percentages mirror the type of plants in our dataset.
9 Unfortunately, we 
were not able to find reliable statistics about the population of seafood processing plants 
in the United States, and so we cannot tell whether these percentages are similar to the 
population shares, or are the result of targeting on the part of the FDA.  
B. Compliance 
An inspector’s first order of business is to establish whether the requirements of 
the HACCP program truly apply to the plant.
10 Our data show that 30% of the plants 
inspected each year do not need a HACCP plan. This proportion is virtually identical to 
that reported by FDA (Food and Drug Administration, 2002).
11  
If a plant is subject to HACCP, then it must have a HACCP plan in place.  The 
percentage of plants subject to the HACCP requirement that had adopted a HACCP plan 
has increased over time, from 65% in the first year of the program to 76% in the second 
year, 82% in the third and fourth years, and 84% in the first six months of the fifth year. 
                                                 
9 Specifically, 2.6% of the plants in our dataset process aquaculture products, 24.5% make ready-to-eat 
products, 57.1% process scombroid species, 9% make smoked fish products, 4.5% make breaded fish 
products, and 26.4% are classified as processing other products. About 78% of the units visited are 
manufacturing facilities, 16% are repackagers, and 16% are warehouses. 
10 A plant is not subject to the HACCP plan requirement, if, for example, there are no food safety hazards 
likely to occur. 
11 About 65% or more of the plants that were inspected in the early years of the program should have been 
inspected again, because they are subject to the HACCP requirements. Yet as of June 13, 2002, these plants 
had not been reinspected. 
  12Inspection reports are in the form of a matrix whose rows are compliance criteria 
and whose columns are sources of foodborne risks. The compliance criteria are grouped 
into three main categories: (i) HACCP plan documentation, (ii) HACCP plan 
implementation, and (iii) a class that is technically not part of HACCP, but rather of a 
pre-existing program, the Sanitation Inspection Program. Within the latter category, 
space is provided for checking for (i) sanitation deficiencies, (ii) inadequate monitoring, 
(iii) inadequate records documenting the monitoring activities, (iv) inadequate corrective 
action for addressing (ii) or (iii), and (v) discrepancies between actual sanitation 
conditions and the records.  Sources of foodborne risk include pathogens, parasites, 
shellfish toxins, scombrotoxins (histamines), chemical contamination, drugs, additives, 
and physical contamination (e.g., pieces of glass or metal).  
The percentage of inspections that resulted in violations is reported for each 
criterion/risk source combination in Table 2. Three major patterns are evident. The first is 
that the rates of HACCP violations are generally relatively low, not exceeding 12% for 
individual cells, while non-compliance rates are considerably higher in the sanitation 
program. The second is that HACCP violation rates are the highest for pathogens, 
followed by scombrotoxins.  Finally, water quality, food contact, and cross contamination 
between batches of products are the most likely sources of sanitation deficiencies. 
Inadequate or non-existing monitoring, on the other hand, is stable across sources of risk 
and is detected in 20-25% of all inspections. The rate at which the records at the plant do 
not mirror the observed sanitation conditions ranges from 3% (employee health) to about 
9% (cross-contamination).  
  13To facilitate the analysis, we collapse all HACCP sources and categories together 
and compute aggregate non-compliance rates, obtaining that 46% of all inspections result 
in failure to comply with HACCP on at least one count, and 64% in at least one form of 
non-compliance with the sanitation program. Within the sanitation program, 43.5% of all 
inspector visits result in observed sanitation deficiencies, 51.7% in inadequate monitoring 
or inadequate records of monitoring activity and/or corrective action, and, finally, 16.6% 
in a mismatch between records and observed sanitation conditions on the premises.
12 
These figures confirm FDA’s remarks that perfect compliance is difficult to attain. 
The rate of HACCP non-compliance has decreased from almost 54% in 1998 to 
41% in 2001 (Table 3). The rate of HACCP non-compliance varies across products and 
with the type of establishment.  For example, non-compliance is highest among smoked 
fish products, where it is about 58%, and lowest among the “other” category of products, 
where it is about 40%. This is consistent with the call for increased focus on higher risk 
products recently issued by FDA (Food and Drug Administration, 2001). Regarding the 
type of establishment, the rate of non-compliance is highest among manufacturing plants 
(48%) and lowest among vessels (38%).  
Seafood processors exhibit wide variation in size of operation, as measured by 
annual sales.  Very small plants with annual sales of less than $25,000 account for 9.5% 
of the total number inspected by FDA.  Small plants with annual sales between $25,000 
and $100,000 account for 8.1% of inspections while plants with sales between $100,000 
and $500,000 account for 14.2% and plants with sales between $500,000 and $1 million 
                                                 
12 The corresponding dummies are SANANY (sanitation deficiencies were observed), SANINADEQUATE 
(inadequate or no monitoring when required; inadequate or no monitoring records when required; 
inadequate or no corrections taken when required; inadequate or no correction records when required) and 
RECANY (sanitation records do not reflect conditions in the establishment).  The dummy 
ANYSANITATION takes on a value of one if any one of the above dummies is equal to one.  
  14account for 10.4%.  Plants with sales between $1 million and $5 million account for the 
largest share of inspections, 24.3%.  Plants with sales of $5-10 million, $10-25 million, 
and over $25 million account for 9.2%, 8.4%, and 8.5% of inspections, respectively. 
5. Econometric Model  
 
In our empirical work, we proxy monitoring precision m with the time between 
subsequent inspections, and observed precautionary effort y with the observed 
compliance status. We therefore estimate two equations.  The first predicts the 
determinants of the time between subsequent plant inspections, and the second explains 
the likelihood that the plant is in compliance. 
Formally, let w denote the time between two subsequent inspections of a plant and 
 its logarithmic transformation, which we assume to depend on a set of plant 
characteristics and variables capturing agency resources (x): 
*
1 y
(3)   ,   it it it y ε + = β x
*
1
where i denotes the plant and t the visit to the plant, β is a vector of unknown parameters, 
and ε is an error term that follows the type I extreme value distribution with scale θ. This 
implies that time between visits (w = exp( ) ) is a Weibull variate with shape parameter 
θ and scale. We assume that there is no unobserved heterogeneity, and hence that 




Estimation of equation (1) is complicated by the fact that our study period for this 
equation is 1 January 1998 (the onset of the program) to 31 December 2001. We, thus, 
                                                 
13 Our choice of the Weibull distribution is motivated by its flexibility. As shown in equation (3) above,  
the hazard  implied by the Weibull distribution can be increasing in w (i.e, the longer time has elapsed since 
the last visit, the more likely is an inspection now), which is the case when θ>1, decreasing in w (θ < 1), 
and constant with respect to w (θ = 1). In addition, we experimented with other possible distributions for 
the time between inspections, such as the lognormal, loglogistic and exponential, and found that fit of the 
Weibull was superior in terms if the Akaike Information Criterion.  
  15observe w (and hence  ) exactly for all inspections at the plant, except for the last one, 
which is censored at the end of 2001. We denote the number of days elapsed from the 
date of the previous inspection and 31 December 2001 as D. Accordingly, the log 
likelihood function of the data is: 
*
1 y







ℑ ∈ ℑ ∈ it
it it
t
it it D S w f L
2 1
) , , ; ( log ) , , ; ( log log θ θ β x β x
where   and   denote the sets of continuous and censored observations, respectively. 
The symbols f( ) and S( ) denote the density and survival function of our Weibull: 
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where  it σ  , the scale parameter of the Weibull, is equal to  ) exp( β xit it = σ .  
Let   be a latent continuous variable denoting propensity to be in compliance. 
We wish to allow for such propensity to be influenced by the expectation of an inspection 
at time t. To capture this, we write  
*
2 y
(7)   ,   it it it it it w h y η δ θ β γ + ⋅ + = ) , ; (
*
2 x z
where z is a set of regressors (some of which may overlap with the independent variables 
in x), γ is a set of regression coefficients, h( ) is the hazard function of   and  w it η  is a  
normally distributed error term. The symbols γ and δ denote unknown regression 
coefficients. The hazard function is defined as the density function divided by the 
survival function of w: 


















and is interpreted as the density of an inspector visit right now, conditional on the fact 
that there has been no visit since the last inspection.  The hazard is in this context the 
most natural replacement for the “probability” of an inspection at time t, which is 
sometimes included in conventional probit or logit models of compliance. 
The latent propensity to be in compliance,  , remains unobserved. What we do 
observe is whether the plant is in violation ( , which we assume to occur when 
, or in compliance ( , which implies that  .  This results in a probit 
equation where the probability of a violation is  
*
2 y
) 1 2 = it y
0
*
2 ≥ it y ) 0 2 = it y 0
*
2 < it y
(9)     ) ) , ; ( ( ) 1 Pr( 2 δ θ β γ ⋅ + Φ = = it it it it w h y x z
where Φ denotes the standard normal distribution. 
  Two caveats are in order at this point. First, since β is unknown and hence h( ) in 
equation (7) is not observed, estimation is done in two steps.  In the first step, we fit the 
duration model, obtain estimates of β and θ, and form predicted values for h( ). In the 
second step, we enter the latter in the right-hand side of equation (7) in lieu of the true 
, and run the corresponding probit regression (9).  The second caveat is that this two-
step procedure introduces heteroskedasticity in the probit equation, which we explicitly 
correct for (see Appendix B for details).  
) ( h
In sum, we estimate an equation for the inspection decision by the agency, and 
one for the compliance status of the plant at the time of the inspection (see Table 4).  Our 
modeling approach differs from the previous literature in that (i) the dependent variable 
  17in the first equation is the time to the next inspection, (ii) we use a duration model, and 
(iii) enter the predicted hazard in the right-hand of the compliance status equation.  
6. Model Specification 
A. Inspection Model 
The conceptual framework presented in Section 3 suggests that FDA’s optimal 
enforcement strategy is characterized by more frequent inspections of plants processing 
products that pose greater food safety risks and plants suspected of exerting less 
precautionary effort.  Our measure of inspection frequency (monitoring precision) is the 
time elapsed between inspections, measured in days.  FDA has identified several classes 
of products as posing greater food safety risks—scombroid fish that can produce 
histamines; smoked fish; and cooked ready-to-eat products.  If FDA is following an 
optimal enforcement strategy, these products should be the target of more frequent 
inspections.  The principal measure of precautionary effort is a plant’s past performance. 
It seems reasonable to expect that plants found to be out of compliance with HACCP or 
sanitary regulations in the past are likely to exert less precautionary effort in the future 
and should, thus, be the target of more frequent inspections. 
The annual sales of each plant are an indicator of operational size, which could 
serve as a proxy for a number of factors influencing the FDA’s enforcement strategy in 
qualitatively different ways.  All else equal, public exposure to food safety hazards 
should be greater for larger-volume plants.  At the same time, if there are economies of 
scale or scope in precautionary effort, larger plants would be expected to exert greater 
precautionary effort.  Larger plants might be less costly to inspect as well.  Since 
  18coefficient of size of operation reflects the influence of a number of potentially offsetting 
effects, it is not possible to make a priori predictions about its sign.   
To further account for the cost of an inspection, we include (i) dummies 
indicating the type of establishment (a manufacturing plant, a vessel, or a repackager, the 
default being a warehouse), (ii) regional dummies, as in preliminary analyses we found 
the number of plants per inspectors to be systematically different across FDA regions, 
and (iii) dummies for the quarter when the previous inspection took place.  The latter two 
variables could be proxies for variations in monitoring costs, in resource constraints, or 
other variations in program operations across regions.  Since they proxy for a large 
number of underlying factors, we have no a priori predictions about the signs of their 
coefficients. 
Many of these regressors are also entered among the determinants of the plant’s 
violation status—z in equation (5)—except (iii), the quarter dummies.  This exclusion 
restriction aids in the identification of the coefficients in equation (7), along with the fact 
that h( ) is a non-linear function of variables and parameters (Wooldridge 2002, p. 234). 
B. Specification of the Compliance Model 
The conceptual framework in Section 3 predicts that the firm’s optimal 
compliance strategy should be characterized by greater precautionary effort when 
inspections are expected to be more frequent, when it poses a greater food safety risk 
(and thus faces a stricter standard), when it faces greater penalties for non-compliance, 
and when compliance is less costly.  Observed precautionary effort is measured in our 
data by a discrete indicator of compliance status that takes a value of 1 if the plant is not 
in compliance and 0 otherwise.  Anticipated inspection frequency is represented by the 
  19hazard rate predicted from the inspection model in Section 5.A.  If FDA inspections are a 
deterrent to non-compliance, the coefficient on this predicted hazard should be negative.   
To capture the marginal cost of effort, we include dummies for the compliance 
status at the last inspection, plus dummies for the plant’s sales, which are correlated with 
plant size and may thus capture any economies of scale in safety.  We include regional 
dummies and establishment dummies as further controls, as well as dummies indicating 
whether the inspection was done directly by FDA inspectors or under the auspices of a 
state-federal partnership, should the stringency of the inspection vary with the agency in 
charge. 
C. Are HACCP and Sanitation Standards Complements or Substitutes? 
As noted earlier, one of FDA’s reasons for introducing the HACCP program was 
a belief that HACCP monitoring and its pre-existing sanitation monitoring were 
complements, so that HACCP methods would allow FDA to improve its enforcement of 
existing food safety and plant sanitation standards within the resource limitations it faced.  
We address this issue by examining the cross-correlation between plants’ compliance 
with HACCP requirements and sanitation standards using separate probit equations of 
compliance with HACCP requirements and sanitation standards.   
In these probit models we control for both the outcome of the previous HACCP 
inspection,  and the outcome of the previous sanitation inspection.  If HACCP and 
sanitation standard are complements, as FDA believed, plants in compliance with 
sanitation standards in previous inspections should be more likely to be in compliance 
with HACCP requirements in subsequent inspections.  By the same logic, plants in 
compliance with HACCP requirements in previous inspections should be more likely to 
  20be in compliance with sanitation standards in subsequent inspections.  Thus, the 
coefficients of lagged sanitation violations in the HACCP violation equation and the 
coefficients of lagged HACCP violation in the sanitation violation equations should all be 
positive. 
By contrast, HACCP and the sanitation program would be viewed as substitutes if 
being in compliance with one reduces the likelihood of being in compliance with the 
other program. This could happen if firms reallocate resources and effort from one to the 
other, or if the two prevention activities are forced to compete for the same pool of 
resources. The problem could be exacerbated by the firm’s perception of HACCP as 
imposing a completely new set of standards and requirements. 
7. Results  
A. Inspection Strategy 
The results from the duration model (Table 5) provide no evidence that FDA 
inspections target plants that, on the basis of past experience, would be expected to exert 
less precautionary effort and very little evidence that it targets inspections according to its 
stated priorities with regard to products viewed as higher risk. The estimated coefficients 
of the duration model indicate that the agency’s inspection strategy does not target plants 
according to past HACCP compliance. On the contrary, the coefficient on the lagged 
HACCP violation dummy is positive and significant, implying that, all else the same, past 
violations are associated with a 10% longer hiatus until the next inspection.  Furthermore, 
it took FDA inspectors 16% longer to re-inspect plants that were required to develop a 
HACCP plan but had, thus far, failed to do so. 
  21The negative coefficients on the dummies for past sanitation violations do imply 
that FDA targets inspections according to some dimensions of past performance, since 
they indicate that the inspectors let less time elapse between inspections of plants that 
were out of compliance with respect to sanitation standards.  However, the coefficients of 
past sanitation violation status are all small in magnitude and only one is individually 
statistically significant (when the records did not reflect actual conditions at the plant).   
Evidence of targeting based on the riskiness of the fish product(s) processed at the 
plant is similarly limited: Only the coefficient on the dummy for smoked fish is negative 
and significant, implying that the time between inspection is, all else the same, 22% 
shorter—134 days, or 4 ½ months—for such plants.
14  By contrast, plants that process 
histamine-producing (scombroid) fish and cooked ready-to-eat products (both classified 
as high-risk and needing attention by FDA) do not seem different from one another and 
from the “other” plants.
15   
Taken together, these results imply that, contrary to our predictions regarding 
optimal enforcement, past performance and riskiness of products play at best a modest 
role in FDA’s seafood inspection strategy.  What targeting there is seems to have been 
based primarily on plant size, as measured by annual sales.  For larger plants in our 
sample (annual sales of $1 million or more), the interval between inspector visits is 50-
55% shorter than for the smallest plants, while the interval between inspections for small 
and medium sized plants (sales of $25,000 to $1 million) is about 50% shorter than for 
                                                 
14 Using a Weibull distribution, we estimate mean duration between visits to be 610 days (s.e. around the 
mean 6.36 days), and median duration to be 502 days (s.e. around the median 5.0 days).  
15 A likelihood ratio test fails to reject the null that all coefficients of breaded products, histamine producing 
fish and cooked ready to eat products are jointly equal to zero (LR statistic = 3.667).  
  22the smallest plants.
16    One possible explanation is that larger plants have a greater 
potential for causing consumer health damage because a larger volume of product means 
greater exposure to health risks.
17    Alternatively, if sales are positively correlated with 
variety of products processed, they may be negatively correlated with inspection costs, 
since the number of inspections agency staff can complete per visit is increasing in the 
number of products processed.
18 
Finally, note that the shape parameter of the Weibull is greater than one, so that 
the hazard rate is increasing in the time elapsed since the last inspection.  
B. Compliance Strategy 
The results of the HACCP and sanitation compliance models (Table 6) are 
broadly consistent with an optimal compliance strategy as characterized by the 
conceptual framework presented in Section 3.  The coefficient of the hazard rate is 
negative in all five equations, implying that plants facing a greater likelihood of 
inspection are less likely to be out of compliance.  In other words, the threat of an 
inspection has a deterrent effect, inducing firms to exert greater precautionary effort.  It is 
noteworthy that the hazard rate coefficient is significant only in the equations for 
observed sanitation violations and lack of sanitation monitoring records.  It is not 
                                                 
16 A likelihood ratio test rejects the null that the coefficients on the sale dummies are jointly equal to zero 
(LR statistic = 498.96, p vale < 0.0001). A series of likelihood ratio tests further concludes that the 
coefficients on SALES2-SALES4 and the coefficients of SALES5-SALES8 are not different from one 
another but rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients of SALES2-SALES8 are not different from one 
another.  The calculation that the time between inspection is roughly 50% shorter for small and medium 
plants is based on a model that imposes the restriction that the coefficients on SALES2, SALES3 and 
SALES4 are equal to one another. If this restriction is not imposed, the time between inspections at these 
plants is 45% to 50% shorter than for the smallest plants. 
17 There is also reason to believe that larger plants are more likely to be in compliance, and hence less 
likely to be inspected. It is possible, for example, that plants with larger sales volumes adhere to stricter 
sanitation standards in the processing operations because of economies of scale in sanitation equipment and 
technical expertise (e.g., specialized staff to oversee food safety) or because their products are more likely 
to be traceable in the marketing chain in the event of a foodborne illness outbreak. 
18 Such a result is entirely consistent with the predictions of the theoretical framework presented in Section 
3. 
  23significant for HACCP violations, suggesting that FDA inspections may not induce 
greater effort in HACCP compliance.  More generally, firms’ compliance strategies 
remain geared toward sanitation rather than HACCP per se.
19  
The coefficients of lagged compliance status indicate that past non-compliance is 
positively associated with current non-compliance. In particular, plants not in compliance 
with respect to HACCP or a particular class of sanitation standard in the previous 
inspection are significantly more likely to be out of compliance with respect to the same 
standard in a subsequent inspection.  For example, in the HACCP compliance equation 
the coefficient on the HACCP violation dummy at the time of the last inspection is 
positive and significant, and implies that, on average, being out of compliance at the 
previous inspection raises the probability of being out of compliance at the next 
inspection by 12 percentage points.
20 Past non-compliance is an even stronger predictor 
of current non-compliance for the three classes of sanitation standard.  The magnitude of 
these coefficients is similar to or even stronger than that for the past HACCP violations in 
the HACCP compliance equation. These results are consistent with the assertion that past 
non-compliance is an indicator of a high cost of precautionary effort. 
                                                 
19 We did examine the question whether time between inspections and propensity to violation are 
endogenous as would be the case if, for example, there are unobserved plant characteristics that affect both 
the time between inspections and the propensity to be out of compliance. We tested for such a possibility, 
focusing on the HACCP inspection model and the HACCP compliance equation by replacing the Weibull 
distribution for time between inspections with a lognormal distribution. If endogeneity is present, then ε 
and η are correlated. To test for this assumption, we estimated the duration model under the assumption of 
lognormality, formed the residuals ε ˆ , and entered them in the right-hand side of the probit equation, along 
with the other regressors, including the predicted hazard rate. The endogeneity test is the t statistic for the 
probit coefficient on the residuals ε ˆ .  Under the null of no endogeneity, for large sample this statistic is 
distributed as a standard normal (see Rivers and Vuong 1988). Indeed, our t statistic was very low and 
failed to reject the null at the conventional levels, implying that endogeneity is not present here.  
20 To examine the effect of this coefficient, we used the estimates from the probit model to predict each 
plant’s probability of being in violation if it had been in compliance at the previous inspection. The average 
predicted probability is 0.4137. We then compute the probability of being in compliance for each plant, had 
it been in violation at the previous inspection. The sample average of these probabilities is 0.5382. The 
proportional change is thus about 30%. 
  24The coefficients of lagged compliance status also indicate some 
complementarities between sanitation and HACCP standards, albeit not the kind cited by 
FDA as motivation for introducing its HACCP program.  Two kinds of sanitation 
violations—observed sanitation deficiencies and a lack of sanitation records—are 
positively correlated with non-compliance with respect to HACCP and all three types of 
sanitation standards.
21  But the estimated coefficients do not support the contention that 
HACCP improves compliance with respect to sanitation standards.  The coefficient of 
lagged HACCP compliance status was significant only in the equations for current 
HACCP compliance status and for inadequate monitoring records, a result that makes 
sense given that HACCP violations are based on record keeping.  But (i) this effect is 
small, and (ii) HACCP compliance is not significantly associated with compliance with 
standards for actual sanitation practices.  Thus, while there is some indication of 
complementarities between sanitation and HACCP standards, those complementarities 
seem to be much more limited than envisioned by FDA. 
Do plants producing risky products like scombroid fish, smoked fish, and cooked 
ready–to-eat products lag in terms of HACCP compliance, as FDA asserted in its 
1998/1999 evaluation of the seafood HACCP program (Food and Drug Administration 
2000)?  The evidence is mixed.  The coefficients of the HACCP compliance equation 
indicate that plants processing smoked fish products are significantly more likely to be in 
violation of their HACCP plans than plants processing other products.  Even though 
                                                 
21 We estimate that, had all plants experienced no observed sanitation deficiencies at the previous 
inspection, the probability of being out of compliance for HACCP would have been, on average, 0.4597. If 
they had been out of compliance with respect to this sanitation standards, the likelihood of being in 
violation would have been, on average, 0.4911 (a 7% increase). If the same exercise is repeated for 
discrepancies between records and observed conditions, the average probability of being out of HACCP 
compliance would have been 0.4725 (RECANYLAG=0) and 0.4857 (RECANYLAG=1). This effect is 
thus modest (3%). By contrast, inadequate plans, records, corrective actions contingency plans, etc. imply 
average probabilities of 0.4328 and 0.5244, respectively, or a 21% increase. 
  25plants processing smoked products are inspected more frequently, they are nevertheless 
more likely to be found out of compliance with respect to their HACCP plans.   
In contrast, plants processing scombroid fish and cooked ready-to-eat products do 
not exhibit a higher propensity to be out of compliance with their HACCP plans, nor do 
plants processing breaded products, which FDA had identified as leading others in 
compliance.  Plants processing aquaculture products were significantly less likely to be 
out of compliance with their HACCP plans.  This pattern may be an indicator of progress, 
in the sense that differences in the propensity to be in compliance seem to have 
disappeared for most product types.  It is difficult to attribute any such progress to 
intensified HACCP scrutiny, however, given that, as noted above, FDA does not seem to 
have targeted plants processing what it considered high risk products for more intensive 
monitoring. 
As in the case of HACCP compliance, there are few systematic differences in 
average compliance rates for sanitation standards across product types.  Plants processing 
cooked ready-to-eat products are more likely to have observed sanitation deficiencies but 
are no more likely to be out of compliance with respect to other sanitation standards.  
Despite FDA’s concern about this activity, aquaculture plants are out of compliance less 
often than the others. In interpreting these results, however, it should be kept in mind that 
the coefficient on the product dummies may capture several different effects—increased 
scrutiny by the agency, different standards, and these plants’ true propensity to be out of 
compliance.  
The pattern for the sales dummies is somewhat unexpected, since it indicates that 
medium and large plants are more likely to be out of compliance than the smallest and 
  26largest plants.
22  We also find that violation rates tend, all else the same, to be higher in 
inspections involving FDA personnel as opposed to those conducted by state officials.  
We also find little evidence of trends in HACCP compliance rates over time, contrary to 
FDA’s assertion in its 2000/2001 evaluation of the seafood HACCP program. By 
contrast, non-compliance with sanitation standards does seem to have decreased over 
time, with average non-compliance rates in 2001 less than those in 2000, which in turn 
are less than those in 1999, all else equal (Food and Drug Administration 2002). This 
effect is limited to the sanitation deficiencies observed on the premises and to inadequate 
or absent records, and extends, as a result, on the overall measure of compliance with 
sanitation rates. 
8. Conclusions 
HACCP has been hailed as a new paradigm for food safety regulation but its 
implementation and actual impacts on compliance with food safety standards have not 
been evaluated.  This paper uses FDA’s seafood inspection records to examine three key 
aspects of its HACCP regulatory program: (i) how FDA has targeted its inspections; (ii) 
the effects of FDA inspections on compliance with both HACCP and plant sanitation 
standards; and (iii) the relationship between HACCP regulations and pre-existing 
sanitation standards.  We develop a theoretical model of enforcement to characterize the 
optimizing behavior of FDA and seafood processors subject to HACCP regulation, which 
we then use to derive hypotheses about FDA’s targeting of inspections and firms’ 
patterns of compliance.  We test those hypotheses using econometric models of 
inspection and compliance.  Previous studies of regulatory enforcement all relied on data 
                                                 
22 The coefficients on the dummies for plant size are, however, broadly consistent with the raw violation 
rates, which exhibit a roughly quadratic relationship with class size. The violation rates are lowest for 
SALES2 and SALES8 plants, and peak for SALES6 plants, where they are about 50%. 
  27in which monitoring was observed only discretely, i.e., whether a firm was inspected in a 
given time period.  Our data, in contrast, allow us to measure inspection frequency 
continuously, in terms of the number of days between inspections.  Thus, our empirical 
analysis is novel methodologically as well as topically. 
Contrary to the predictions of the theoretical model and to FDA’s own stated 
policies, FDA does not seem to have targeted inspections based on product risk or past 
compliance performance.  Plant size accounted for the only systematic variations in 
inspection frequency we observed: Plants with sales of $1 million or more were inspected 
more often than plants with sales between $25,000 and $1 million, which were in turn 
inspected more often than plants with sales under $25,000.  The reasons for this apparent 
targeting by size of operation are not clear, although severe resource constraints are a 
possible explanation. 
Firms’ compliance strategies seemed to be broadly in accord with the predictions 
of the theoretical model.  The threat of inspection increased the likelihood of compliance, 
although, interestingly, the deterrent effect was statistically significant for sanitation 
standards but not for HACCP.  Firms tend to persist in compliance status, especially with 
respect to sanitation standards.  Contrary to FDA’s presupposition, however, HACCP 
compliance does not improve compliance with sanitation standards, suggesting that the 
two are not complementary. 
Some caveats with respect to our study are in order.  First, our data come from the 
first four years of HACCP implementation.  Our results may thus reflect the situation 
during a period of transition to a new policy regime with which both FDA inspectors and 
seafood processing firms lacked familiarity.  Follow-up studies using more extensive 
  28data—including data from years prior to HACCP implementation as well as a lengthier 
period  ex post—would be needed to determine whether the inspection targeting and 
compliance strategies we observed were transitory or permanent.  Second, our data lack 
detailed information about processing firms and about FDA enforcement resources.  We 
were unable to find either but, if such data did become available they might shed 
additional light on the determinants of FDA’s inspection and firms’ compliance 
strategies. 
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Table 1. Frequency of HACCP inspections at seafood processing plants. 





































Table 4: Frequencies of non-compliance with HACCP and sanitation regulations in the JIFSAN seafood7 dataset (out of all inspections) 


















HACCP plan documentation 
Reasonably likely to occur hazard 
not identified  7.25  0.72  0.53  0.26            3.03 2.20 0.88 2.06 1.76
Inadequate or no critical control 
point identified  5.51  0.17  0.22              0.15 2.55 0.98 0.29 1.35 0.88
Inadequate or no critical limit 
identified  11.56                 0.48 0.40 0.24 6.62 1.81 0.61 1.96 1.44
Inadequate or no written 
monitoring procedures  9.58  0.55  0.39              0.22 5.59 2.05 0.68 1.74 1.39
Inadequate corrective action 
procedures 6.30              0.38  0.27  0.22 3.56 1.20 0.36 0.87 0.99
HACCP Plan Implementation 
Inadequate implementation of 
monitoring procedures  9.76  0.49  0.35              0.30 6.02 1.81 0.63 1.61 1.00
Inadequate or no monitoring 
records  12.17                 0.79 0.56 0.51 7.64 2.34 0.88 2.34 1.68
Inadequate or no corrective 
actions taken when there is a 
deviation from the critical point  5.62                  0.33 0.22 0.19 2.86 0.98 0.39 0.62 0.65
Inadequate or no corrective action 
records  5.10                 0.52 0.47 0.42 2.86 1.30 0.66 0.90 1.31
 
Sanitation 






















Sanitation deficiencies observed  13.80 16.84  20.34  14.60          6.69 9.12  1.68 12.66
Inadequate or no monitoring 
(when required)  16.13  18.34  21.59            18.66 17.80 18.33 15.26 17.71
 
Inadequate or no monitoring 
records (when required)  21.04  24.15            27.60 26.15 26.67 26.78 24.35 25.06
 
Inadequate or no corrections 
taken (when required)  2.06                4.06 3.98 3.29 1.94 2.40 1.18 3.34
 
Inadequate or no correction 
records (when required)  5.93                9.08 9.44 8.37 6.44 7.14 5.61 7.87
 
Sanitation records do not reflect 
conditions in the establishment  4.39                8.22 9.18 6.90 4.24 4.78 2.60 6.17
 
  
Table 3. HACCP violations 1998-2001. 
YEAR  Number of inspections resulting  
in HACCP violations  
Percent of HACCP inspections 










Table 4. Summary of equations and samples. 
Equation   Study period  Type of observations and 
sample size 
(1) Duration model for time 
between inspections  
1 January 1998 (program 
inception) to 31 December 
2001. 
Continuous and right-
censored; N=10158  
(2) (variant 1) Logit model 
of HACCP violation status  
(variant 2) logit model of 
sanitation inspection 
violation status 
1 January 1998 (program 
inception) to 31 December 
2001. 
Binary indicator; N=5299 
 
  34Table 5. Determinants of Time to Next Inspection. Accelerated hazard duration model with 
Weibull baseline hazard.  Dependent Variable: Time (Number of days) between subsequent 
inspections. N = 10,108.  
Variable  Parameter estimate  Standard Error  Pr Chi Square 
Intercept 7.452*  0.056  <.0001 
Compliance status at the previous inspection 
HACCP Violation in Previous 
Inspection 0.098*  0.021  <.0001 
No HACCP Plan When 
Needed in Previous 
Inspection 0.153*  0.027  <.0001 
Observed Sanitation 
Deficiency in Previous 
Inspection  -0.036 0.021  0.0974 
Sanitation Records Not 
Reflecting Actual Conditions 
in Previous Inspection  -0.058*  0.026  0.0256 
Inadequate or No Monitoring 
Records in Previous 
Inspection 0.038  0.022  0.0826 
Product processed dummies  
Smoked products  -0.245*  0.035  <.0001 
Breaded products  -0.006  0.043  0.8943 
Histamine-producing species  -0.030  0.021  0.1562 
Cooked ready-to-eat products  -0.027  0.024  0.2678 
Aquaculture species  0.133*  0.063  0.0348 
Sale categories 
$25,000 to $100,000 
(SALES2) -0.588*  0.050  <.0001 
$100,000 to $500,000 
(SALES3) -0.673*  0.044  <.0001 
$500,000 to $1 million 
(SALES4) -0.659*  0.047  <.0001 
$1 to $5 million 
(SALES5) -0.798*  0.041  <.0001 
$5  to $10 million 
(SALES6) -0.811*  0.047  <.0001 
$10 to $25 million 
(SALES7)  -0.779* 0.048  <.0001 
$25 million or more 
(SALES8)  -0.804* 0.049  <.0001 
SALESMISS -0.154*  0.029  <.0001 
Scale 0.711  0.007   
Weibull Shape  1.406  0.014   
 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
Additional controls: quarter of the previous inspection; dummies for the type of establishments, 
regional dummies.   
  35Table 6. Determinants of violation under HACCP and Sanitation Programs. N=5299. Standard errors 
in parentheses. 




































Compliance status at the previous inspection 












No HACCP Plan When 

























Sanitation Records Not 
Reflecting Actual 












Inadequate or No 












Product processed dummies 






























































































































































































* Significant at 5% level. 
 Additional controls: regional dummies, dummies for the type of establishment. 
  37Appendix A: A Game Theoretic Model of HACCP Enforcement and Compliance 
The firm chooses the level of precautionary effort a it wishes to exert.  The cost of 
that precautionary effort, C(a), is assumed to be convex.  To simplify the analysis, 
assume further that the firm is never liable for damages, so that all social damage from 
inadequate precautionary effort is costless to the firm in the absence of regulation.   
Relaxing this assumption does not alter the qualitative conclusions of the analysis. 
The regulatory agency observes a level of precautionary effort y, that is unbiased 
for the true level of effort but is subject to observation error, so that 
(1)     y = a + (1-m)ε, 
where 0 < m < 1 represents the precision with which the agency inspects the firm and ε is 
a white noise error.  The agency is obliged to inspect the firm periodically, hence m > 0.  
If the agency were able to monitor processing at all times and places it occurs at the firm, 
it would be able to observe the firm’s precautionary effort without error (m = 1).  It 
cannot, hence m < 1 and thus the firm’s true level of precautionary effort remains its 
private information.  A higher value of m indicates greater precision in inspection, due to 
a combination of more frequent visits with lengthier and more thorough inspection during 
any given visit.  Let K(m) denote the convex cost of monitoring. 
The firm will be found out of compliance and fined an amount s whenever 
observed precautionary effort falls short of that specified in the HACCP plan, y < a , or 
(2)     




< ε . 
Assume that the firm’s observed effort is non-negative, which implies ε ≥ -a/(1-m).  Let 
Φ(.) denote the cumulative probability distribution of the observation error, ε.  Then the 
probability that the firm will be found out of compliance is 






































) , , (  
We assume that Fa < 0, increases in the firm’s preventive effort always decrease the 
probability of being found out of compliance.  It is easily verified that this assumption 
holds under the standard monotone likelihood ratio condition that φ/(1-Φ) is 
monotonically increasing.  It can also be verified that  0 < a a F  and  , the 
productivity of effort is higher when the HACCP plan is more stringent and when 
monitoring is more precise.  We assume that Faa > 0 as well, as will always be true when 
the likelihood ratio increases at an increasing rate and will generally be true otherwise. 
0 < am F
In this model, it is possible for the firm to be observed out of compliance when its 
level of effort meets or exceeds the standard, a ≥ a , i.e., false negatives are possible (as 
in Polinsky and Shavell 2000 and Raymond 2004). 
During the enforcement phase both a  and s are predetermined, so that the 
agency’s sole choice involves the precision with which it monitors the firm’s 
precautionary effort, m.  We assume that the agency bases its monitoring decisions solely 
on safety grounds and thus has no interest in any income generated from fines.  The 
human health damage avoided depends on the firm’s degree of undercompliance, 
) ( a a D − .  We assume that this social cost is convex and that its third derivative is 
negative, i.e., that the agency’s utility function for safety exhibits decreasing absolute risk 
aversion. 
  39Finally, we assume that the agency is not required to precommit to a specific 
inspection strategy so that its degree of monitoring precision m is chosen simultaneously 
with and independently from the firm’s precautionary effort level a. 
The Firm’s Optimal Behavioral Response 
The firm’s optimal choice of precautionary effort a minimizes the total cost of 
HACCP compliance  ) , , ( ) ( m a a sF a C + .  The necessary condition characterizing this 
choice is 
(A1)     ,  0 = + ′ a sF C
the firm balances the marginal cost of precautionary effort, C′, against the reduction in 
the expected fine for being found out of compliance, sFa.  Condition (4) is sufficient if 
(A2)     ,  0 ≥ + ′ ′ aa sF C
which is always satisfied under our assumptions. 
Condition (A1) implicitly defines the firm’s optimal level of precautionary effort 
) , , ( * a s m a  as a function of monitoring precision m, the fine for non-compliance s, and 
the HACCP standard a .  Differentiating, we find 












firms facing a stricter HACCP standard exert greater precautionary effort and 














firms expecting greater monitoring precision exert greater precautionary effort. 
  40To investigate the effect of cost on effort, let the cost of precautionary effort C(a) 
=  βc(a).  Higher values of the parameter β indicate higher total and marginal cost.   
Differentiating the first order condition (A1) then gives 












The Agency’s Optimal Behavioral Response 
The firm’s true level of precautionary effort is private information, hence the 
agency must base its inspection strategy on observed precautionary effort y instead of 
actual precautionary effort a.  We assume that the safe precautionary effort, a , is 
determined by policymakers prior to and independently from enforcement strategy.   
Using equation (1), the observed avoided human health damage can be written 
) ) 1 ( ( ε m a a D − + − .  The agency’s goal is thus to minimize this expected avoided 
damage,  )} ) 1 ( ( { ε m a a D E − + − , plus the cost of monitoring, K(m). 
The necessary condition characterizing the agency’s optimal degree of monitoring 
precision m* is thus 
(A6)     0 ) ( } { = ′ + ⋅ ′ − m K D E ε , 
the agency balances the expected marginal avoided social cost against the marginal cost 
of increased monitoring precision.  Condition (A6) is sufficient when 
(A7)      ,  0 } {
2 ≥ ′ ′ + ⋅ ′ ′ K D E ε
which always holds under our assumptions. 
Condition (A6) implicitly defines the agency’s optimal monitoring strategy 
) , ( * a a m  as a function of the firm’s precautionary effort a and the HACCP standard a .  
Differentiating, we find 
















a firm that the agency expects to exert more precautionary effort will be monitored with 
less precision (under the assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion, which implies 
E{D″⋅ε} ≤ 0); and 
















a firm with a higher HACCP standard will be monitored with greater precision. 
 
Appendix B. Statistical Model of Inspection and Compliance 
The hazard function is estimated from the duration model and is used as a 
regressor in the model determining variables affecting plants being in violation of the set 




 (B.1)    ,      it it it it h y η δ γ + + = z
*
2
where η is a standard normal variate. The mapping to the observables assumes that a 
violation is observed ( ) if  , while no violation is observed if  . This 
results in a probit model where the dependent variable is the violation/compliance 
dummy and the independent variables are z and the hazard rate. 
1 2 = it y 0
*
2 > it y 0
*
2 ≤ it y
  We cannot measure the true hazard,  , because it depends on unknown 
coefficients. To estimate the probit model, we first estimate the duration model, and then 
we use the estimated coefficients from the duration model to form a prediction for  . 
Doing so, however, introduces heteroskedasticity into the resulting probit equation.  
it h
it h
  42To address this problem, note that equation (7) can be re-written as follows: 
(B.2)     .   ] ) ˆ [( ˆ ˆ ˆ *
2 it it it it it it it it it it it h h h h h h y η δ δ γ η δ δ δ γ + − + + = + − + + = z z
The error term is brackets is heteroskedastic, and its variance is  .  We 
calculate the variance using the delta method: 
)) ˆ ( 1 (
2
it h Var δ +
(B.3)   ,   ) / )( ˆ var( ) / ( ) ˆ var( Γ Γ Γ ∂ ∂ ′ ∂ ∂ = h h h
where  ] [ θ M β Γ =  is the vector of parameters from the duration model, and finally amend 













2 2 ) ˆ var( 1
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The parameters in this likelihood function are estimated by the method of maximum 
likelihood. 
 
  43